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Abstract:  
Despite the recent decentralization reforms, citizenship and freedom are still problematic in many 
Sahel countries. This paper focuses on the topic of citizenship in the Guéra region of central Chad. 
It opens with a brief history of the region, from its long days as a slave-reservoir for neighbouring 
Muslim sultanates until colonization by the French at the beginning of the 20th century. It then 
focuses on the way the French organised the area administratively, facilitating the creation of a local 
elite through the customary authority system. This arrangement led to the creation of a system in 
which people could fully enjoy their rights only under the protection of one of the customary 
authorities recognized by the state. In this process, people previously labelled as the descendants of 
slaves were able to gain in status and thus become part of the ruling elites. The post-colonial state 
suffered a long period of instability that preserved and reinforced this system of governance, which 
was then further strengthened by the recent policies of decentralization. Three cases are presented in 
order to explain this system of governance and its effects: the stories of David and Abdel, the case 
of the land around Kuju village and the resettlement of Ibis village. These cases show how local 
people’s ability to exert their rights depends on the protection of a recognized customary authority. 
Nowadays, if they are to fully enjoy their rights, Guéra people need to be “citizens of a chief”. The 
local elites that emerged during the colonial period are still in political control and individuals need 
to negotiate with them when building their own life projects.   
 
Introduction 
This paper aims to analyse citizenship and state building in the Guéra region in central Chad. It 
argues that in the Guéra region people have needed, and still need, to be affiliated to a powerful 
local family if they wish to have their citizenship rights recognised. Therefore, the emancipation of 
former slaves and other powerless groups depended on their capacity to unite around a powerful 
family and on their recognition by the colonial and post-colonial states as a customary group with 
its own customary authority. The local idea of freedom, the strategies of local actors and the social 
trajectories of people labelled as descendants of slaves are all related to this point. 
The contemporary political situation of Guéra is rooted in local history. The Guéra region was 
for centuries a slave-reservoir for the Wadai, a Muslim sultanate that traded slaves on a massive 
scale with the Ottoman Empire. Slaves were captured and sent across the Sahara, supplying the 
Benghazi slave market. The peak of this trade was in the second half of the 19th century. At the 
beginning of the 20th century Wadai surrendered to the French army and the trade was ended. In 
precolonial Guéra there was never a central power able to control the whole territory and the local 
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class of slaveholders held only small numbers of slaves (Le Cornec, 1963; Tubiana, Khayar, 
Deville, 1978). A system of local authorities was established by the colonial state in the 1920s. At 
this time local groups settled in the plains for the first time and chose their own customary leaders, 
under the authority of the French colonial government (Duault, 1938). The process of the 
emancipation of former slaves thus began with the colonization of the territory and was based on 
affiliation to powerful families. People previously labelled as descendants of slaves were united 
under the authority of a chief and awarded the same rights as other ethnic groups. On the basis of 
this initial gain, they were able to secure further rights and are nowadays effectively emancipated, 
though they still bear a stigma that is sometimes used against them in the local political arena. 
The ‘customary authorities’ established by the French colonial authorities in 1923 were for 
several decades the most effective institutions in post-colonial Chad, where a fierce civil war 
divided the country between the 1960s until the 1980s. The stability of the central government has 
been improving since the 1990s and a new nationwide system of decentralized authorities has been 
introduced. However, despite the relative political stability and the improving infrastructure, these 
reforms did not bring radical political changes in the Guéra region. Rural areas and cities have been 
developed under two different administrative systems: whereas in the cities there are new locally 
elected authorities, in the countryside the role of customary chiefs as local representatives has not 
been challenged. 
The argument I wish to develop is that this situation is the outcome of a particular state building 
project: that the policies of the colonial administration and those of the post-colonial state are part 
of a continuum: the priority of both, throughout, was to maintain control over what had always been 
a sparsely populated region in order to facilitate the exploitation of its natural resources. The 
creation of a system of local elites able to control the variety of groups inhabiting Guéra and to 
foster their agricultural production was the strategy adopted for this purpose. In the first part of the 
paper I will analyse the historical processes that led to the formation of the local elites in the Guéra 
region and the absorption of former slaves into the political arena. Then I will analyse the 
contemporary political context using a number of accounts collected during my fieldwork. The role 
of the traditional elites and the relationship between decentralization and state building are the most 
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important elements of my analysis. I will finally attempt some conclusions about the meaning of 
citizenship in the Guéra region. 
 
1. A village at the foot of the mountain, in the Guéra region. Photo by V. Colosio 
 
History of Guéra 
The Guéra region is a mountainous area in the east-central part of Chad, 300 km southwest of 
Abeche, the capital of the precolonial Wadai sultanate. This sultanate was created in 1635 by a 
family from the Arabian Peninsula and was the dominant power in the area until the arrival of the 
French in the 20th century (Tubiana, Khayar, Deville, 1978). Though the histories of Wadai and 
Guéra are deeply interrelated, this mountainous region was never fully controlled by the sultanate: 
Cordell (1985; pp. 14 - 16) defined Guéra as a region at the outer limits of Islamic expansion in sub 
Saharan Africa. Although Wadai troops conducted raids into non-Muslim areas in order to capture 
slaves, the spread of Islam was generally slow and peaceful, assisted by the conversion to Islam of 
some elite Guéra groups who then began collaborating with the Wadai soldiers in the area. 
Islamisation was finally achieved after the French colonial authority imposed peace in an 
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environment that fostered Islam. The consolidation of Muslim aristocracies was supported by the 
French, who wanted to govern using a light-weight administrative system and it was confirmed 
under the different regimes of the post-colonial state.  
An historical analysis of the Guéra region can elucidate the processes which underlie the 
contemporary political situation. I have divided the history of Guéra into four main phases, the first 
of which is the precolonial period, up to the 1910s, when the French began to take possession of the 
area. Then, during the colonial period (up to 1960), the basis of what is now the Chad state and its 
administrative divisions were arranged by the French. Thirdly, between 1960 and 1990, the state 
experienced a long period of war and instability, during which the first independent government 
was overthrown in 1975. Lastly, the regime of Idriss Deby took power on the 1st December 1990, 
since when it has imposed state power through rigorous military control, the deployment of 
infrastructure projects and administrative reforms that have progressively increased the role of the 
local authorities. I will present this process, showing how it promoted a kind of governance based 
on local hierarchies; and then I will describe how this governance works through cases I found 
during my fieldwork.  
 
The pre-colonial period 
Before colonization by the French, the main political actor in eastern Chad was the Wadai sultanate 
which, according to tradition, was created in 1635, unifying different local ethnic groups. It 
achieved the peak of its power and influence during the 18th and 19th centuries, thanks to the trade 
in slaves across the Sahara. The Guéra region, inhabited mainly by non-Muslim people, was an 
important slave-reservoir for this sultanate: Wadai soldiers would regularly visit Guéra in order to 
capture slaves. This became a massive phenomenon in the second half of the 19th century, when 
Wadai was the most important source of slaves for Libya and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. 
During this period, local people, nowadays collectively known as Hadjiray (from Hadjar, 
“mountain” in local Arabic), used to live in hiding in the mountains, where they could access water 
and store their reserves of cereals. Wadai warriors usually organized their missions to Guéra in the 
dry season, when movement was easier. They collected slaves, livestock and cereals as taxes from 
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the groups who accepted their authority and raided those who refused to surrender and hid in the 
mountains. Usually the groups who refused Wadai protection were those who did not convert to 
Islam, collectively defined as kirdi by the Wadai warriors. The only groups periodically inhabiting 
the plains surrounding the mountains were the nomadic Arabs, who regularly crossed the region 
with their livestock and helped the Wadai soldiers in their raids. Despite their regular visits, 
however, Wadai could never impose the level of direct control over the territory that it had in other 
regions closer to its capital, Abeche (Fuchs, 1997; Banana Yoyana, Magnant, 2013). 
The mountains are the most important part of the Guéra region, as they offered shelter to non-
Muslim people who migrated there and tried to resist the regular raids by Wadai soldiers. The 
mountains also facilitated the survival of local groups, as they worked as water collectors in the 
Sahelian area, facilitating the formation of small rivers and forest where people could find water 
and food. So, for at least two centuries, this area had seen regular encounters between, on the one 
hand, a growing Muslim civilization whose contacts with the kingdoms on the other side of the 
Sahara brought them increasing wealth and power and, on the other hand, scattered groups of 
people whose need to resist the Muslim raiders obliged them to co-operate with each other 
politically. According to Cordell (1985), this “frontier” between the Muslim and non-Muslim 
worlds in Sahelian Africa should not be considered Muslim civilization’s continually expanding 
front; rather, it created a common ground of exchanges and transformations - often, but not only, 
conflictual - where the institutions of both Muslim and non-Muslim groups were transformed and 
melded. Wadai incorporated and kept some pagan customs, for example in the Sultan’s 
enthronement ceremony, based largely on non-Muslim rituals, including human sacrifice (Zeltner 
1997). At the same time, the Hadjiray perceived the Muslim groups – Wadai warriors and traders as 
well as Arab herders - as more powerful and prestigious and saw conversion to Islam as a way to 
improve their conditions. Nowadays, in the myths of Hadjiray, the various Guéra groups claim there 
was a migration from the east and they date their conversion to Islam in the remote past. There 
were, though, local groups that progressively converted to Islam and cooperated with Wadai, giving 
them slaves and cattle as tax. Moreover, there were groups of Wadai soldiers who settled in the 
Guéra region and raided the neighbouring areas, cooperating with Wadai’s seasonal campaigns and 
remaining in the region, maintaining “slave camps”. 
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These slave camps are described by many local sources in the Guéra region, though there are no 
documents about them. The European explorers who studied the Wadai slavery system described 
the caravans organized by soldiers for attacks on the slaving zone and collect captives, but there are 
fewer studies of the strategies adopted by local people for collecting slaves and handing them over. 
According to local sources there were several camps in Guéra where captives were collected and 
housed before being sent to Abeche. These camps were managed by an aqid, a Wadai general in 
charge of a particular geographical area. The aqid could be either a member of an aristocratic 
family or a former slave subsequently integrated into the army. In the literature I could find no 
mention of a Wadai aqid in the Guéra region, but the memory of the slave camps and the aqid 
managing them are still strong. These camps, together with those of the Arabs, were the only 
settlements in the plains. Usually the aqid developed cooperative relationships with the people 
inhabiting the mountains nearby and used to hunt slaves and livestock in the more remote areas. For 
all the other indigenous groups, it was not safe to live or move in the plains. There were defensive 
alliances and mixed marriages, but only between very close villages; migration from remote areas 
was rare and related to dramatic events such as a famine or, in the case of individuals, to crimes or 
accusations of sorcery. Conflicts between local groups were very frequent, usually over control of a 
river or a good hunting area and captives taken in these conflicts were important for those groups 
who used to pay their taxes to Wadai soldiers when they came1. This was the situation when the 
French arrived, at the beginning of the 20th century. 
1] This information all comes from my interviews with local people during my fieldwork (since August 2014 until June 
2015). 
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2. A valley surrounded by the Abou Telfane Mountain range, 20 km south of Mongo. Photo by V. Colosio 
 
State building, colonization and civil war 
A modern state machine was introduced to Guéra by the French. The colonization of Chad started 
from the western part of the country: the French conquered the area where the two main rivers, 
Logone and Chari, merge, in April 1900. During their expansion toward the East, they encountered 
the troops of Rabih, a Muslim warrior from the Sudan with an army of slaves who had already 
subjugated the sultanates of Bagirmi and Bornou. The French defeated him at Kousseri (nowadays 
in Cameroon) and built a military camp on the other side of the Chari. This camp, Fort Lamy 
(nowadays N’Djamena), became the centre of the French settlement in Chad and later the capital of 
the country. From Fort Lamy, French soldier slowly moved eastwards, in a very difficult 
environment. They reached the Guéra region in 1906, built a military post and then began slowly to 
consolidate their control of the territory, trying to make military alliances against the Wadai 
sultanate, which continued to raid the area to collect slaves and to mobilize local Muslim groups to 
resist French invasion.  
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Once the French arrived, the captives found in the region under their control were liberated and 
those who remembered their origins went back to their native villages (Duault, 1938). During the 
1900’s, the French progressively reduced the raids from Wadai and pressured the mountain people 
to come down and settle in the plains. The region was fully pacified only after 1911, when the last 
resistance from the Wadai sultanate was defeated. Despite resistance by local groups who did not 
trust French, by the beginning of the 1920s all the groups were finally settled in the plain of the 
Guéra region, which was part of the broader Batha2 region, whose capital was Ati, around 150 km 
north of Mongo, Guéra’s main town. 
The Guéra region has traditionally been a border land between the Muslim sultanates of the 
Sahel and the scattered pagan groups living in the savannas. Its plains have never been inhabited by 
local groups because they regarded them as insecure, so the resettlement imposed by the French had 
a deep impact on the local ethnic and political landscape. From the 1920s, the colonial state tried to 
control this area, whose population was sparse and widely distributed, by means of a ‘light-touch’ 
administration, as there were few resources to sustain it. They negotiated the division of the area 
into cantons with the existing elites and tried to preserve as much as possible of the existing social 
order. In 1923, the heads of the more powerful clans were recognized as “chefs de canton”, 
representing a group of villages speaking a similar dialect. The “chefs de canton” were in charge of 
tax collection and land arrangements in their cantons and represented their people before the 
colonial authorities. They were appointed by the French as representatives of a group of villages, 
but the geographical borders of their cantons were never officially established.  
The creation of the “customary authorities”, based on the division of local groups into various 
“cantons”, created ethnic divisions that still exist. During this process, various ethnonyms were 
created and established by the colonial authorities. The people who remained in former Wadai slave 
camps - the captives or the descendant of captives who had forgotten their native villages and the 
warriors and the other people managing these camps - were called Yalnas3, a word meaning “the 
2 The French expansion toward the east concentrated mainly on the region that is today Batha, which was easier to 
control. In 1958 the Batha, a Sahelian area mainly inhabited by Arab herders, was separated from the Guéra region, a 
mountainous area with a huge variety of ethnic groups, and from the Salamat, which lies to the south-east of Guéra and 
is inhabited by Arab herders and the Rounga people. 
3 This term is used as an ethnonym for a particular group of older captives by the French in their reports, but in the 
interview I have collected, the opinions about its origin are slightly different. The people called Yalnas says they used 
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sons of the people” in local Arabic. It is not clear whether this label was created by other groups in 
order to define them or was used by their leaders, the aqid from Wadai, in order to hide their 
relationship with the sultanate, which at the time was at war with the French. The ethnonym Yalnas 
is nowadays used all over Chad to define a group of people without a clear origin and speaking as 
their mother tongue the local Arabic, which is a lingua franca for all the groups in Guéra but is 
spoken as a mother tongue only by the nomadic Arabs and the Yalnas. In the Guéra region there 
was an important group of Yalnas who were extremely cooperative with the French from the 
beginning of colonization. At that time, local Arabic was the only language that the French could 
understand, but the other Hadjiray could not speak it. The so called Yalnas therefore played an 
important brokerage role in the first phase of French settlement in Guéra and developed good 
relations with them. It was thanks to their good relationships with the colonial power that the 
Yalnas were recognized as an ethnic group and received some cantons (Duault 1938). Although not 
all their neighbours accepted them as a real indigenous ethnic group, the colonial state awarded 
them the same rights as the others. 
Local people emphasize the huge difference between the “Wadai period”, when nobody could 
even walk in the plains without being captured, and the French period, when people were free to 
settle without danger and the raids had ended. Security and freedom of movement are the main 
changes that they associate with the French colonization. Apart from some changes related to 
tensions in the early years after the creation of the cantons, the administrative divisions created by 
the French remained unchanged until the decentralizing reforms began in the 2000s. The 
administrative system implemented in those years, based on the chef de canton as a crucial link 
between central government and local communities, is still the backbone of the Chad state. During 
the colonial period, the French tried to promote agriculture, especially cotton farming, and the 
creation of new elites able to cooperate with the colonial administrative machine. In the Guéra 
region cotton farming was not tenable and there was persistent resistance to the French school 
this label in order to regroup a vast range of people from various origins living together, while according to their 
neighbours, it was the name for the people living in the Wadai slave camps. This ethnonym was initially accepted in 
order to be recognized as a group by the French but in the last two decades many groups of Yalnas have been trying to 
change it. I will use this broader label in order to maintain the confidentiality of the particular group involved in my 
research. 
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system, so the region remained at the margin of the modern state machine (Le Cornec, 1963; 
Khayar, 1976).  
The state building process forced different ethnic groups to coexist for the first time in the same 
political machine. Competition for power among the groups intensified during this period 
(Lemarchand, 1986; Azevedo, 1998). When Chad obtained independence, in 1960, all Chadians 
were recognized as citizens of the new republic, but there were many social and ethnic issues 
dividing the country. Various rebellions spread shortly after the creation of the republic, the first of 
them in Guéra in 1965. Rebels backed by Sudan quickly took control of a substantial part of the 
region. Fighting between the official army and the rebels was fierce all over the Guéra region, 
which had a deep impact on the local population. The customary authorities came under pressure 
from both the central government and the rebels in their battle for power. Many local chiefs were 
arrested by the police or killed by the rebels, and the majority of the villages had to be resettled for 
security reasons. The post-colonial state was virtually ineffective in Guéra for over two decades, 
from the rebellion of 1965 until the late 1980s. Hissene Habré, who took power militarily in 1982, 
was the first President to achieve important victories in Guéra, though the rebels did not finally 
abandon the region until after the accession of his successor, President Idriss Deby Itno, the current 
president, who overthrew Habré in December 1990. 
 
Decentralization and authoritarianism under the Deby regime 
The Deby regime has been Chad’s longest-lasting and the most effective in imposing state authority 
all over the territory. During the 1990s, the central government gradually defeated the rebels or 
incorporated them in the state machine. After the implementation of the 1996 national constitution, 
Chad began a slow process of decentralization, reorganising the various levels of the local 
administration and opening up the country to multilateral donors and civil society organisations and 
during this period foreign investment, attracted by the political stability and the unexploited 
resources, came into the country. In 2003 Chad started to extract oil; this financed an ambitious 
infrastructure programme which radically improved the capacity of the central government to 
control the territory, at least in the southern and central part of the country, whose main cities were 
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all connected by paved roads. This included the Guéra region, where many villages would 
previously be isolated for weeks in the rainy season. Nowadays it takes a few hours whatever the 
season to go between Mongo and N’Djamena whereas in the 1990s it could take two or three days 
in the rainy season. Contact between the capital and the Guéra region improved, increasing both 
opportunities for local people and the capacity of the central government to control the area. 
Interestingly, the capacity of the state to control the territory came along with the decentralization 
process. While the periphery became more connected with the capital and the decentralized 
authorities obtained more power to enforce central government policies, new local authorities such 
as regions and city councils were created. Meanwhile, many civil society organizations sprang up, 
fostered both by the funds of the multilateral donors and by the need of the government for more 
effective local actors implementing their policies. The cantons, whose number and extent had 
changed little since the colonial period, dramatically increased in number as the central government 
opted for creating new, smaller cantons, appointing as chiefs people close to the ruling party. 
Whereas the first postcolonial governments had feared that the canton chiefs could join rebellions, 
the Deby regime identified them as potential allies in their attempt to control the localities, despite 
the spread of political actors brought into existence by decentralization.  
Nowadays, the creation of new cantons and the struggles between powerful families to be 
appointed as “chef de canton” is the most debated political topic in the Guéra region. All my 
informants described the strong relationships between the powerful families fighting for a canton, 
the local civil society organizations looking for community support and the politicians negotiating 
among those actors. A substantial number of people, though, have negative feelings about these 
new local elites. Although the state is expanding its presence and a widespread network of local 
civil society plays an important role in the political arena, widespread dissatisfaction is expressed 
when people talk about freedom and citizenship. Through all the different transformations of the 
Guéra political arena over time, the control exercised by local elites over individuals remains 
strong. Of the new institutions created since the 1996 constitution, only the city council have been 
elected by citizens (in 2012). All the other local authorities (governor, prefect and sub-prefect) are 
appointed by the central government; the customary authorities (sultans, canton chiefs, village 
chiefs) are chosen according to the various “customary” procedures, but their appointment has to be 
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approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs. The creation of new institutions offered new 
opportunities for being enrolled inside the state machine; but these opportunities are still controlled 
by various local and national elites. The modalities of local governance seem to have been affected 
only marginally by these reforms. 
In the introduction, I presented the main argument of the paper, that in the Guéra region 
affiliation to a local powerful family was the main venue for citizenship. This situation is not related 
to a failure of the local citizenship project, but is its culmination. Previously, the region was 
regularly harassed by Wadai soldier and local groups lived scattered in the mountains, trying to 
avoid enslavement. French intervention had the goal of stopping the Wadai slave trade, bringing 
security to Guéra and preserving the social ties which could guarantee peace and cohesion in the 
area. Therefore, once the raids and the slave trade stopped, local institutions were forged on a very 
hierarchical model, with those appointed as authorities being the heads of those families that were 
most effective in guaranteeing order. Local elites took advantage of the creation of the customary 
authorities and everyone not related to one of those families tried to be included in their social 
network. The post-colonial state maintained this approach and the recent decentralization reforms 
seem to be further strengthening the power of local elites. Each person’s life projects have to be 
negotiated with those elites, so affiliation to a powerful family remains virtually the only way to 
access opportunities. The next paragraph will elaborate this point. 
 
Contemporary venues for security and empowerment 
When I was talking with local informants about their life stories and their projects for the future, the 
importance of being in a good social network always emerged as a central topic. Being linked to a 
local powerful family or individuals involved at the head of local organizations makes it easier to 
access both resources (especially land, labour and marriage partners), and opportunities to be 
integrated in the state system. Belonging to a recognized lineage, or being informally affiliated to it, 
seem to be important conditions of being accepted as a full citizen and having access to crucial 
rights. In the Guéra region, access to resources and the means of securing one’s rights depend on 
the state which, despite its weakness, has the power to definitively establish access to land and the 
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rights related to it, and to provide employment and access to services. Local civil society is growing 
in importance, thanks to its ability to mobilize grassroots groups and to interact with multilateral 
donors. But those organizations are strictly controlled by the state and act as brokers, distributing 
resources in the territory under the strict supervision of the state authorities. Therefore, interacting 
with the state is crucial for Guéra people and this needs to be mediated by powerful local families. I 
will present three stories, collected during my fieldwork, which I think help us to understand the 
contemporary situation in the Guéra region. In the first I will present the strategies needed if one is 
to be ‘integrated’ in the state machine, which is probably the safer career for local people who want 
either to have a regular income in addition to what they earn from agricultural labour or to gain help 
from the state machine in supporting their friends and relatives. This second element is better 
explained by the other two stories, which show how local authorities fight for villages’ rights. 
 
Accessing the state: individual trajectories in local administration4 
“Integration” was the word chosen by my informants to describe the process of finding a venue for 
individual empowerment inside the state machine. In the Guéra region the state was perceived as 
something alien during the colonial era and then it was virtually absent for almost three decades. 
However, in the life stories I have collected, its role has been crucial not only at the beginning, for 
their recognition as a group, but also in later years, providing opportunities for the members of the 
ruling families and guaranteeing protection of their rights when they were threatened by other 
groups. The main venues for integration in the state by the Yalnas has been the school. In the Guéra 
region, there was strong resistance to the French school system, as there was almost everywhere in 
the country. Using its usual top-down approach, the French government tried to involve the sons of 
the local elites in the school, hoping that their presence would stimulate other children to go to 
school and that through providing education they could build a class of local administrators able to 
cooperate with them. In many contexts this dynamic fostered important changes in local power 
relations, as the powerless groups were often more conscious of the benefits of schooling and the 
4 This story and the two that will follow are based on interviews I have collected during my fieldwork in Guéra. In order 
to preserve the privacy of the people involved, I have changed the names both of the people and of the places involved. 
For the same reason, I am using the broader label of Yalnas, without specifying the particular group of people involved. 
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opportunities it brought. In the case of Guéra, however, this was only partially true: on the one 
hand, the majority community, which had a long tradition of Islam and was openly opposed to 
Western education, lost some of its power because it lacked Western-educated leaders. On the other 
hand, as the French involved mainly the same families as they appointed to head the cantons, local 
elites were the main beneficiaries of Western education. For a group like the Yalnas, this was a 
chance to access the political arena as a local ethnic group and to weaken their stigma. Their 
inclusion in the political arena came with the creation of a local elite, related to their “royal family”, 
appointed by the French when the canton was created. In this sense, the Yalnas could became 
“citizens of the chief”, recognised in the same way as any other group, conditional on their 
respecting the hierarchy imposed by the state.  
The story of David can explain this process. His uncle, Abdel, was a close relative of the first 
Yalnas chief and was sent by him to school, under pressure from the colonial government. Abdel 
was the first to learn French and became a close advisor of Yalnas chiefs, both the one who had sent 
him to school and his son, who was appointed when the father became too old to rule. As David lost 
his father when he was a child, Abdel decided to take care of him. In 1960, when Chad gained its 
independence, Abdel created the first school in the main Yalnas village. At that time, attendance 
was extremely low and after a few years the school was closed because of the civil war. Abdel 
continued to act as David’s personal tutor, until he had to leave the village because he was 
considered too close to the rebels. Whereas the first rebellions were mainly military actions against 
the central government, the violent reaction of the Chad army led many former state officials, 
especially in the north and the east of the country, to abandon the government and to sympathise 
with the political party supporting the rebels. When Abdel had to leave the village, David could 
already read and write in French, and so the canton chief asked him to replace Abdel as his 
counsellor, despite his young age, and he fulfilled this role throughout the 1970s. This was a very 
difficult period in the Guéra region: relationships between local authorities and customary 
authorities were very tense and many canton chiefs – including the Yalnas chief – were arrested as 
suspected rebel supporters. David was never involved in this kind of trouble, but learned how to 
deal with politics and, when the situation calmed down and the Yalnas village school could reopen 
in the 1980s, he was appointed headteacher.  
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3. The tree where David and Abdel opened the first school. Photo by V. Colosio 
 
Under the new political regime created by Hissene Habre in 1982, Abdel could also return and 
he started his political career at the departmental level. After some years as an unpaid voluntary 
teacher, David’s position was made an official, paid, one and he was subsequently given roles in the 
local administrative machine. Abdel continued to help him and together they could support the 
canton chief, whose authority was challenged by legal actions by their neighbours and rivals. They 
helped him to manage a range of issues related to land. Abdel’s social networks, involving people at 
central government level encountered during the rebellions, were crucial in providing support to the 
Yalnas chief. David learned from him and thanks to his help was appointed to the city council of the 
Guéra regional capital when this institution was created as a part of the decentralization process in 
the 1990s. In this period the Yalnas canton was at the centre of several development processes. The 
Yalnas canton chief was a close friend of the founder of one of the first local civil society 
organizations, a member of a ruling family from a group allied with the Yalnas. Abdel and David 
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tried to facilitate its activities, while the chief used his power to mobilize the community in support 
of their initiatives. The rebuilding of David’s former school was one of the first development 
projects undertaken by a local organization in the region. Since then many other have followed, as 
the money available for such initiatives dramatically increased during the 2000s.  
Abdel is retired nowadays, having attained the role of prefect in another department; David is 
still a member of the city council. All his sons were able to study in the school and one of them was 
appointed official counsellor to the new canton chief, another role recently created as part of the 
decentralization process. At the city council he is supported by the founder of the first local NGO. 
David says that, as the Yalnas canton is quite small, he cannot raise a huge body of support and 
obtain a high-level role with the city council, but he did secure an important role in the land tenure 
management office, where he is still employed. He hopes to help one of his children, who currently 
work in the school, to become ‘integrated’ in the state system before he retires, as Abdel did with 
him. The new canton chief, who is quite young, regards David and Abdel as important counsellors 
in political matters and they have helped him a lot on a wide range of issues. Every problem that a 
Yalnas individual has (mainly land issues, but also tax or labour problems) needs to be handled by 
the Yalnas chief. The chief is notified of the issue - and can find a solution and guarantee the rights 
of “his citizen” - only through the mediation of people like David and his social network.  
The other two stories illustrate issues faced by two different communities and examine how a 
political solution can be found. 
 
Owning the land and inhabiting the land: the antenna in Kuju  
In discussions with the elders of the villages one always meets the distinction between ownership of 
the land and the right to use the land, and the issues arising around land tenure are many and 
complex. The land tenure system is strongly linked with previous religious practices. The 
ownership of the land was agreed to rest with the spirit of the mountains. The first group inhabiting 
Guéra claimed to be born of the mountains and to be the representatives of those spirits. All the 
groups that migrated to Guéra, especially after the expansion of the Wadai sultanate from the 17th 
century onwards, had to respect this worship in order to be allowed to settle there. Over the 
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centuries, many waves of migrants arrived in the Guéra region and mixed with the indigenous 
groups: they were usually allowed to settle and farm, but were considered guests, with no rights 
over the land they inhabited. During the precolonial period, because of this insecurity of tenure, and 
because it was considered more important to control resources such as rivers or rich forests than the 
land, agriculture played a small role. So migrants could settle with no problem, as long as they 
respected the worship of the mountain spirits and, therefore, the first arrivers’ ownership of the 
land. However, the distinction between the right to inhabit and the right to own was unclear and, 
according to local informants, has always been a source of conflict. With the massive migrations of 
the 19th and 20th century, related to the escalation of Wadai raids and the conflicts between them 
and the French, the situation became more complex. The groups mixed a lot and nowadays, 
although almost everyone claims to have some indigenous ancestors, it is impossible to distinguish 
between the various waves of migrants.  
This confusion has many contemporary political consequences. All over Chad problems of land 
ownership and cattle grazing and cultivation rights cause constant conflict. In the absence of a 
central power controlling the territory and able to impose its rule, local groups would sometimes 
come to temporary agreement but would also sometimes fight for control of an area. The colonial 
state simply appointed local leaders in order to collect taxes and keep order, but it did not draw 
official administrative borders between the various local groups. Even today the country has no map 
showing the borders of the different cantons (Baniara Yoyana, 2013), so conflicts continue. The 
story of Kuju illustrates this kind of problem and the strategy available to a potentially weaker 
group, like the Yalnas, for securing their rights. 
Kuju is a Yalnas village in Guéra, built at the end of the 19th century very close to a non-Yalnas 
village by a group who had moved away from a bigger Yalnas village because of internal tensions. 
The people of Kuju say that the land belongs to them, because of a marriage undertaken by their 
ancestor with a group of indigenous people at the beginning of the 19th century, giving them 
ownership over an area which included the site of Kuju. Their neighbours claim, conversely, to be 
the real owners and argue that they allowed the Kuju people to settle there when they had to leave 
their previous location, but did not give them the ownership of the land. The area now at issue is a 
valley where two mountains ranges meet and because both groups previously inhabited the 
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mountains, it is not clear which group has rights over the plain. The two villages moved down from 
the mountains during the colonial era and settled very close to each other. There were already links 
between them in the precolonial era and the security brought by the French fostered mixed 
marriages. At that time, the main things a couple who wanted to marry and live together needed was 
to find a plot of land to farm and some support to build a house. Intermarriage between two 
neighbouring villages was therefore easy to arrange when land was plentiful and there was no 
important discord over land ownership.  
 
4. A traditional Guéra meal, made of sorghum polenta and dried tomato sauce. Photo by V. Colosio 
 
The problems started during the 1980s: two families, one from Kuju and one from the 
neighbouring village, quarrelled over their mutual field boundaries. The situation escalated to 
violence and people were killed on both sites. Local heads of families and the respective canton 
chiefs failed to find an agreement. The state established a border area where nobody could farm, but 
the deep roots of the conflicts were not tackled. Local informants described this conflict as quite a 
common occurrence in the region but related it to the particular individuals involved, avoiding the 
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broader topic of the land tenure system. “Everyone can farm everywhere, there is plenty of land 
here”, people often say, omitting the sensitive issue of ownership.  
The conflict was calmed down by state intervention and since then people from both villages try 
to avoid farming in that area. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, a local mobile phone 
company decided to install an antenna very close to Kuju and therefore paid compensation to the 
village authorities and hired a family as watchmen for the antenna. This decision provoked the 
immediate opposition of the other village, who argued that although Kuju people inhabited the land 
they were not its owners, so all the benefits related to the installation of the antenna should go to 
them, the real owners. In this case, the conflict was handled from the beginning at the level of the 
customary authorities. The chiefs of the two cantons each mobilized their elders, many of whom 
occupied roles in the administrative machine, to try persuade the prefect that they were entitled to 
that money. David and Abdel were involved and obtained the support of contacts in the capital, who 
dug out documents from the colonial period that proved their canton’s legitimate claim to the land. 
These documents proved that Kuju was recognized by the colonial state as a village of the Yalnas 
chief, who thus had the right to receive the compensation payments. All the debate at the state level 
was about which canton chief was recognized by the state as the representative of the village and 
the state declared that the Yalnas chief was the head of that village and, therefore, the owner of its 
land, despite their neighbours’ refusal to recognize their entitlement on the grounds that, as 
migrants, they had been allowed to settle the land but not to own it.   
When I talked with local people, almost everyone told me that the Kuju people arrived later, so 
the land should not be considered their land, but because of the agreement between the colonial 
state and local authorities, they are officially recognised as owners of that land. These rights, 
though, have to be regularly enforced by local elites. Nowadays, a Kuju family live around the 
antenna site and receive a regular income from it, while the compensation money was divided 
between the Yalnas elders and the elders of the village. People in Kuju are aware that their rights 
over the land depend on the capacity of the Yalnas chief and his social network to prove their 
ownership over it before the state. Despite the fact that most of their neighbours regard them as 
migrants or former captives, their customary representatives were recognized by the colonial state, 
whose structure was inherited by the contemporary Chad republic. They know they need to use their 
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customary representative system if they want their rights to be enforced, and that the issues that the 
colonial state did not sort out, like the exact boundaries between the cantons, can still cause 
difficulty. The issue of the boundary between Kuju and their neighbours is still unresolved, though 
the intermingling between the two communities continues via mixed marriages. 
 
Re-building a village: the story of Ibis 
Ibis was a camp of Arabs who decided to abandon their nomadic life and settle at the beginning of 
the 20th century. When the French established the administrative division of the area, Ibis remained 
isolated from all the other Arabs villages, which were allocated to the neighbouring region of 
Salamat. Despite their village being almost 90km from the main Yalnas village, the people of Ibis 
asked to be placed under the authority of the Yalnas canton chief because they shared a common 
language. Ibis strengthened its ties with the Yalnas group through weddings and regular visits. 
Although the inhabitants of the village call themselves “Arabs” and recognized their difference 
from the Yalnas, they have found it convenient to ally themselves with them and to merge with 
them. The chief of the village, a former French soldier, created a strong personal link with the 
family of the canton chief and, thanks to his pension from France and the knowledge he acquired 
while working as a French soldier, he is regarded as an important elder of the canton and has the 
capacity and the resources to take a lead. The two groups consider themselves brothers and agree 
that the Yalnas canton chief can support the claims of Ibis before the local authority.  
This was very important for the recent history of Ibis. As is the case for many villages in the 
Guéra region, their story has been fraught with problems. Ibis is mentioned in the colonial 
documents describing the region in the 1920s, when they decided to settle and they accepted the 
authority of the Yalnas chief (Duault, 1938). They chose an area that had a lot of fertile land, but 
was close to the mountain and far from the main towns. At the time of the rebellions, they were 
evacuated to a bigger village, which subsequently grew to the size of a town, along with other small 
groups. At the beginning of the 2000s, when the situation was calming down, the chief of the 
village decided to return with his group to their original village, after 30 years in the town. As the 
population had dramatically increased in the 1990s, land and water around the town had become 
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scarce; thus, the groups decided to go back to their previous location, where land was still abundant. 
Thanks to the personal savings of the village chief and the support of their allies, they could dig a 
well, a necessary precondition for any village in Guéra. In a few months, Ibis was rebuilt in its 
previous location and a group accepted the village chief’s authority and moved there. Some family 
members of the canton chief also moved there, helping to rebuild the village and looking for new 
fertile land. However, after a few weeks, a neighbouring group asked the state to evict them, as they 
did not recognize Ibis as the legitimate owners of the land. The customary leader of this canton had 
no alliance with the Yalnas and considered Ibis land to be in their canton’s area, so they did not 
accept the creation of the village. As in the Kuju case, the relationship with the Yalnas chief was 
crucial to the villagers’ having a voice and avoiding eviction.  
After all efforts to find a solution between the two canton chiefs proved fruitless, a government 
mission was organized in order to solve the problem. The Ibis chief, together with the Yalnas chief 
and his elders, discussed the case with the local prefect and the representatives of the other cantons, 
after which the authorities recognised their right to the land. The Ibis village chief had served for 
several years in the French army and knew a lot about the decisions made by the colonial 
government about Ibis at that time. He was able to demonstrate all the family connections that 
induced the Arabs of Ibis to place themselves under the authority of Yalnas chief in the Guéra 
region; and colonial documents were also found that recognised the existence of Ibis and their 
contribution to the construction of the first road there, in the 1930s. Thus, the Ibis people were not 
nomadic Arabs trying to occupy land illegitimately, but part of an officially recognised group, 
owning rights to land. The authorities decided that the village of Ibis could be resettled in its initial 
location, and the chief of the neighbouring cantons agreed. The farming land available for the 
people of Ibis was to be established by a state mission, which would establish an official border 
between Ibis land, under the authority of the Yalnas chief, and the neighbouring areas. As in the 
Kuju case, this latter task is likely to be more difficult to achieve.  
Nowadays many nomadic groups want to settle and become farmers. Climate change and 
growing dangers during the transhumance are making the nomadic lifestyle more difficult than in 
the past. I have met with various individual Arabs, in Mongo, who decided to stay in town: they 
sold some cattle to make some capital and took up new activities, mainly in trade. For a whole 
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group, however, settling is much more difficult. There are two Yalnas camps currently on the move 
in Guéra and, despite their wish to settle and their friendship with the canton chief, they have not 
yet been able to find available land and must continue to move seasonally around the region. The 
people of Ibis got their opportunity in the past, based on political changes under the colonial state 
that made their settlement possible; and they continue to try to protect and secure their position 
through their alliance with the family of the canton chief. 
 
Citizen of a chief: how lineages are crucial in the Guéra political context 
Through these three stories I have tried to show that citizenship in the Guéra region is related to 
belonging to a recognized lineage and that this is a consequence of the way the state has been 
organized in the area. Opportunities for groups to protect themselves and for individuals to 
implement their own life projects are strongly connected to the personal ties they are able to 
establish with their “customary representatives”. A number of points emerge from these stories.  
The first point is that the opportunities for an individual to develop his life projects alone have 
been few. Individual access to land is mediated by the group and is often insecure. Other 
opportunities can be found if there is social support and until now the main option for people in the 
Guéra region has been the state. Both David, thanks to Abdel’s support, and the chief of Ibis, 
because of his involvement in the army, could achieve important social positions and support their 
close allies by their participation in the state administration which, despite decades of insecurity and 
weakness, remains an important actor: being integrated inside it is still considered the best option. 
Unless an individual decides to migrate and make a life outside Guéra – in the capital or abroad, 
migration from the Guéra region has been and still is a very important phenomenon – it is crucial to 
be part of a strong social network that is recognized by local institutions and therefore able to 
provide security and opportunities. Despite the growing complexity of the local political scene it 
seems that increasing numbers of people can be involved without changes in the existing power 
relations, via the new opportunities in local civil society and the new administrative posts created by 
the state. Ethnic affiliation plays an important role both in the new local organizations, which are 
often created by family members of the customary authorities or by people close to them, and in the 
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local authorities, where the opportunity to start a career and to be integrated depends on decisions 
made by insiders and on how power is distributed between them. Despite the widespread 
dissatisfaction expressed by my informants about this situation, there are, so far, no movements 
openly contesting the existing power relations: integration is seen, and preferred, as a safer strategy 
than conflict. 
The second point I want to emphasize follows on from this: the long history of insecurity all over 
the Guéra region and the related need for the protection of a big man. As Guéra was a slave 
reservoir, Wadai did not impose direct rule, but would come and harass local groups. The insecurity 
was widespread and there were no recognized institutions guaranteeing the people protection. 
Security came with the French colonial government, through the impositions previously described. 
David was lucky despite losing his parents early, because he was protected by his other relatives, 
who were close to the canton chief. They supported him at the school and enabled him to remain in 
the village, while other youths were obliged to go to more secure places by the need to flee the 
violence or to find a job. They arranged his wedding and put him in a secure position, where he 
could build a family and try to create his own social network. He had access to this position because 
he had powerful men – his uncle and the chief – protecting him and supporting his life-journey. 
Having attained his position, he is expected to help maintain the security of his community.  
The third point to emerge is that the stories of Kuju and Ibis show the importance of people like 
David and Abdel in the local authorities. A canton chief can participate in local meetings with the 
authorities and present his arguments, but with such a flawed and complex customary system as that 
ruling in the Guéra region, it is crucial to have insiders in the authorities, able to develop the most 
effective strategies for the defence of the rights of “his citizens”. In Ibis the group was able to return 
to their previous village and settle thanks to the personal skills of their chief. With his pension he 
had enough resources to dig a well and move his people back. The good relations he built with the 
canton chief, who considered him one of his elders, were a guarantee of protection in case of an 
attack on the legitimacy of the village, and this guarantee turned out to be needed when an attack 
did occur. Social networks and the capacities of people in high positions to mobilize them are 
crucial in the Guéra political arena and individuals always need to take this into account when 
planning a project. 
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5. Farming activities around a traditional water well. Photo by V. Colosio 
 
These stories and the observations I made during the fieldwork led me to argue that the citizens 
of Guéra are able to fully enjoy their rights if they are, directly or indirectly, under the protection of 
a customary chief or of powerful men close to him. I have interpreted this situation in the light of 
history, as the result of a particular political project, initially established by the colonial authorities 
and then pursued and enforced by the post-colonial state during its troubled existence in the Guéra 
region. The recent decentralization process seems to be more a continuation of the central state’s 
attempt to extend its control of the territory than an attempt to involve local communities in political 
life. Local people are often sceptical when there are discussions about citizenship and democracy in 
the Guéra region: their life projects rely on the protection of big men, confirming and strengthening 
the vertical ties on which the local political arena is based.  
A final remark is that, although I did not find open opposition to the control of the local political 
system by these social hierarchies, this does not mean that local society offers the local elites its 
solid, wholehearted support. When David described his life to me, he openly said that its main 
decisions were not for him to take alone: his wedding was arranged in order to confirm local 
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alliances, his education had the goal of having a representative inside the institution, and it was his 
chief who decided that he should spend his life in the village, whereas he would have liked to travel 
more. There were, too, many elements of his story that emphasized tensions and changes: he 
arranged and organized the first wedding of his older child but had no control over the younger 
one’s, whose job allowed him to leave the region, fleeing his relatives’ control. This is very 
important because, for men wishing to obtain some form of independence, finding a marriage 
partner and a plot of fertile land were the necessary first steps. The network of local civil society 
organizations acts mainly as an agent of the state and the international donors, implementing their 
wills under the strict control of the local elites. On the other hand, the increase in the numbers of 
opportunities in these fields in recent years has brought new employment opportunities, which can 
help some individuals to build up a small amount of capital and knowledge and offer the chance to 
leave the region, or at least to escape partly from their relatives’ control. A similar role is played by 
new kinds of profession, such as the nurse or the community teacher, whose numbers are increasing 
along with decentralization, and who are becoming progressively less manageable by the elites. 
Community teachers typically move between different villages and they often find a wife by 
themselves and move to another village, reducing their families’ control. For a woman, becoming a 
nurse does not in itself bring much autonomy, but it still is an emancipatory option, at least to the 
extent that it reduces her need to find a husband. Nowadays these options are mainly negotiated 
inside the family and with the relevant local elites, but they can slowly foster new dynamics and 
new ways of claiming citizenship. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have examined the ideas of freedom and citizenship in the context of a region that 
was a slave reservoir, where security and protection have for a long time been the main issues for 
local people. I have analysed local life stories, focusing on how individuals try to achieve their own 
life projects and on their interactions during this process with the local political arena. The 
argument I have developed is that, though formally citizenship is nowadays recognized all over the 
Guéra region and there is no discrimination against the descendants of slaves, the local ideal of 
 
 
27 
 
 
citizenship contains some peculiar characteristics and generates disappointment among local 
people. I have used the expression “citizen of a chief”, in order to highlight the fact that Guéra 
people need, if they are to deal successfully with the local authorities or elites, to be admitted into a 
particular social network. The vertical ties with these authorities guarantee safer access to resources 
and opportunities. My argument is that this situation is the result of a political project that started 
with the administrative division of the Guéra region in the 1920s and continued in the post-colonial 
period, when the state desperately fought to maintain control over an area massively damaged by 
rebellions. Local elites gradually gained in power during this process and it was an increasingly 
necessary strategy for individuals to be affiliated to those elites in order to obtain protection and to 
be able to approach the state. Interestingly, during this process, the people locally labelled as 
descendants of slaves were given the opportunity to create their own group and, therefore, to have a 
representative, guaranteeing them the same rights as the other groups, despite their stigma. 
However, for them as for the other groups, their rights are related to their belonging to a group: if 
you are not allied with a customary chief or some other local political representative, your rights 
over land and your opportunities to find employment or to marry are dramatically reduced. Whereas 
the recent decentralization reforms and the concurrent rebuilding of the state after a long civil war 
are in some ways strengthening the power of local elites, giving them more leverage on local 
political arena, they are also creating new opportunities for individuals to have life projects less 
dependent on those vertical ties. Nowadays many people accept that they are a citizen of a chief and 
look for integration among the elites, rather than confrontation, but these dynamics are somewhat 
controversial and might well be the source of struggle and social change in the future. 
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